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ANTENUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS
Zimmer: Public Policy,
The Courts,
and Antenuptial Agreements Specifying

PUBLIC POLICY, THE COURTS, AND ANTENUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING ALIMONY
Pursuant to the rule that contracts in derogation of the marital relationship are void as against public policy, courts generally have voided
alimony provisions in antenuptial agreements. A few jurisdictions, however,
have indicated a possible relaxation of their inflexible position toward this
type of antenuptial contract. Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida
assumed the lead in this area by upholding an antenuptial agreement
stipulating alimony. This note will examine the traditional rationale of
applying the derogation rule to alimony provisions, suggest the obsolescence
of this application in light of new societal conditions, and trace the development of Florida's new decision. Finally, it will propose a solution to problems
unresolved by the new decision.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERLYING CONCEPTS

A protected legal right dashes with a favored legal status when a
couple executes an antenuptial contract containing an alimony provision.
The individual's right to contract is counterpoised by the state's interest in
preserving the marital relation. The basis for this conflict can be found in
the early common law, which influenced the development of both the right
to contract and the legal concept of marriage.
Development of the Wife's Right To Contract
At common law, marriage merged the wife's legal identity with that of
her husband." The basis for this concept was twofold. Until the Industrial
Revolution the medieval Western family was the basic economic and social
unit in a predominantly agrarian society. Males worked the land while
females managed the internal affairs of the household. The father was the
dominant figure in the family's social relations, while the role of the mother
was confined solely to domestic duties. 2 Moreover, religious dogma held that
man and woman were united into "one flesh" by the solemnization of the
marriage vow.3 The unity fiction enshrined the husband's superiority so
completely that a wife could not own or dispose of tangible or intangible
property. 4 Similarly, she could not contract, and marriage discharged any
agreement made between the spouses before marriage. 5 Thus, antenuptial
and postnuptial agreements were not recognized at common law.
'What spouses could not do directly, however, they were able to accomplish through a trust device to effect indirect antenuptial agreements. The
husband and wife each contracted with a third party who received the
1. 2 A.
2.

LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACrS
W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIErY 207 (1959).

§90.2 (1964).

3. Note, Interspousal Immunity in Tort: Its Relevance, Constitutionality, and Role in
Conflict of Laws, 21 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 484 (1969).
4. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 239.
i. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 1, §90.2.
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husband's covenant of support and held it for the use of the wife who made
a return promise to the trustee.6 Concurrently, equity courts gradually
developed the concept of a wife's separate property.7 The gradual extension
of legal rights to the wife culminated in the enactment of the Married
Women's Property Acts,3 which made women legally equal to men with
respect to property and contracts. Under these acts spouses could contract
with each other during marriage, and antenuptial contracts were no longer
voided by the unity fiction.
The Law's Concept of Marriage
Along with the extension of property rights to the wife, the basic policies
underlying the law of marriage gradually changed. Originally, marriage was
exclusively a religious matter, and the ecclesiastical courts maintained sole
jurisdiction over both marriage and divorce. 9 Litigating family problems
provided the church with revenue, thus impelling the ecclesiastical courts to
retain legal authority to resolve all family differences. 10 Because these courts
viewed matrimony as a sacrament, marriage was irrevocable. 1 Where consent to divorce or separation was granted, it was only when the parties were
wealthy and powerful.12 In England, jurisdiction of divorce and separation
proceedings was not transferred from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil
courts until 1857.13 In America, however, the colonists rejected the sacramental theory of marriage, and marital matters were thus always subject to
civil court jurisdiction.'1
Nevertheless, American courts were profoundly influenced by English
tribunals, which, in turn, followed precepts derived from religious dogma
that held marriage to be irrevocable. In Evans v. Evans, -5 a wife sought legal
separation alleging her husband's desertion. The English court stated that a
married couple cannot be legally separated because of the mere disindination of one or both partners to cohabit:' 6
1 A. LINDEY, supra note 1, §3.3.
7. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 239.
8. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 708 (1969). FLA. CONsr. art. X, §5 provides: "There shall be no
6.

distinction between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition,
or encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that dower or curtesy may
be established and regulated by law." The 1970 Florida legislature recently enacted a law
effective Oct. 1, 1970, which in fact enables men and women to deal with their property
without distinction as to sex. This act expressly purports to conform the general laws of
Florida with FLA. CONsr. art. X, §5. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4.
9.

P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIACE AND DIVORCE 88 (1959).

10. Id.

11. "What therefore God has joined together, let not man put asunder." Matthew 19:6.
The Roman Catholic Church still considers marriage to be irrevocable.
12. P. JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 88. The foremost instance was the divorce negotiation
between England's Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon.
13. P. DEVLIN, Tim ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 65 (1965).
14. P. JACOBSON, Supra note 9, at 89.

15. 1 Hag. Con. 35, 161 Eng. Rep. 466 (1790).
16. Id. at 36, 161 Eng. Rep. at 467.
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For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve
the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great
severity upon individuals; yet it must be carefully remembered that
the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. [Spouses] ... learn to soften by mutual accommodation that
yoke which they know they cannot shake off.
Although American courts recognized that marriage could be dissolved, the
theory that the state was a party to the marriage was asserted to rationalize
the state's interest. 1 This theory resolved the tension between a policy of
marital indissolubility on the one hand and state regulated divorce and
separation on the other. Another view rationalizing the state's interest in
the marital relationship theorized that marriage is not merely a contract
determined by the parties, but a status that imposes upon the parties
obligations to society as a whole.18 Thus, courts have maintained the state's
power over marital relationships.
After the enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts, the provisions of some antenuptial contracts inevitably conflicted with the legal concept of marriage, challenging the state's third party role. When this occurred,
courts usually emphasized the sacredness of marriage and employing various
standards, 9 held that any contract disturbing the marital relationship was
void as against public policy.20 Eventually, precedent compelled rigid application of these public policy rationales, with the result that in many decisions
courts mechanically voided alimony provisions by relying on policy that
seems questionable today. Current attitudes and social norms relating to
marriage and divorce indicate that courts should reexamine the public
policy governing antenuptial contracts.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS THAT SPECIFY ALIMONY

There are two broad classes of antenuptial contracts: agreements that
concern property rights and those concerning personal rights incident to
marriage.21 Courts generally favor prenuptial property agreements specifying
the spouses' rights in property acquired by marriage.2 2 Such agreements are
considered to be consistent with public policy because they ensure domestic
harmony by settling potential property disputes prior to marriage.
Antenuptial agreements that waive or vary personal rights or duties may
be voided, however, if they appear to undermine the marital relation.

17.

Potter v. Potter, 101 Fla. 1199, 1204, 133 So. 94, 96 (1931); P. JACOBSON, supra note

9, at 88.
18. Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Note, Marriage, Contracts,
and Public Policy, 54 HAav. L. REv. 473, 479 (1941). Comment, "A Check List" for the
Drafting of Enforceable Antenuptial Agreements, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 615, 631 (1965).
19. See text accompanying notes 24-48 infra.
20. RFSTATMENT OF CONTRACTS § §584(1), 586 (1932).
21. Comment, supra note 18, at 630.

22. E.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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Because the wife's right to alimony is personal, 23 the courts have closely
examined antenuptial agreements that either waive alimony or set fixed sums
in lieu of alimony in event of divorce. Until recently such agreements were
consistently invalidated on various grounds. 24 Some courts reasoned that a
waiver or stipulation of almony would enable a husband to shirk his legal
duty of support, 25 which unlike property rights, is considered a duty imposed
by law and cannot be distributed or varied by contract. 26
Another contention supporting this result is that society must be protected from supporting non-wage earners.2 7 Whether society would have to
support the wife, however, depends on the facts of the particular case.28
In instances where the antenuptial contract adequately provides for the wife's
support, or where the wife is independently wealthy no additional burden
on society would exist. Nevertheless, courts have generally been unwilling to
admit that any antenuptial alimony provision could be valid. Thus, in
voiding all such provisions because they allegedly burden society, the courts
have failed to consider individual circumstances and have voided contracts
somewhat arbitrarily with a mechanically applied rule of law.
In another group of cases alimony provisions in antenuptial agreements
were invalidated on the ground that the agreements permitted the husband
to mistreat his wife. Crouch v. Crouch29 held void an antenuptial agreement
providing for a lump sum payment to the wife in lieu of alimony. The
court reasoned that a mercenary husband, knowing that his pecuniary liability was limited by the alimony provision, could abuse his wife with
immunity. By forcing her to sue for divorce, such a husband could, in
effect, buy a divorce for less than he would otherwise have to pay. Using
the same rationale another court stated: 30

ihe existence of a valid contract of this sort could not but encourage
him to yield to his baser inclinations and inflict the injury. As it was
obviously adapted to produce this result, it is to be presumed that this
was one of the inducements which made him desire its execution.

23. Comment, supra note 18, at 630.
24.

Id.

25. Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906); Garlock v. Garlock, 279
N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939).
26. Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Hillman v. Hillman, 69
N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1947), affTd, 273 App. Div. 960, 79 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1st
Dep't 1948).
27. Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820 (1908).
28. See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
29. 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1964). Cf. Rice v. Rice, 148 Fla. 620,
4 So. 2d 850 (1941), where the court recognized that mercenary females sometimes prey
upon older husbands. "[T]his case is just another picture of what happens to Grandpa in
nine cases out ten when he gets home from Grandma's funeral with some cash and goes
angling for a senorita the same vintage of his younger daughters. It is somewhat remarkable that he lacks the intuition to discern that it's the cash and not Grandpa she is
playing for .... Id. at 624, 4 So. 2d at 851.
30. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 4, 103 P. 488, 490 (1909).
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Such reasoning presumes a causal connection between the alimony provision and the subsequent divorce action. A detailed examination of the
causes of divorce is beyond the scope of this note; however, the modern
view holds that divorce is merely legal recognition of marital breakdown,3 '
which may be caused by combinations of many factors. 32 One commentator
notes that in general "the increasing frequency of marriage failure is rooted
in the tensions of modern living, in the desperate search for individual
happiness, and in the highly differentiated American culture." 33 To hold
that alimony provisions in antenuptial agreements cause divorce in all cases
oversimplifies the complex nature of marriage breakdown. 34 While an alimony provision could contribute to marital breakdown in some instances, in
other situations it may be entirely irrelevant. The effect of an antenuptial
contract on the marriage should be determined on a case-by-case basis, rather
than predetermined by application of a mechanistic rule.
Alimony provisions in antenuptial agreements have also been viewed
as creating a financial inducement to separation or divorce. Because courts
generally believe that marriage is beneficial to society, they have endeavored
to discourage the spouse who might be induced to break the marriage vows
because of alluring financial stipulations entered into before marriage. 35
Under most of the agreements considered by the courts, the husband would
owe his ex-wife less than the amount usually granted under a divorce decree
in which alimony was determined solely by the court. Thus, courts have
held that enforcement of such antenuptial agreements would give the husband undeserved profit36 and would necessarily cause disagreement and his
eventual abandonment of the marriage.37 This contention also oversimplifies
the causes of divorce.38 If financial inducements tended to cause divorce,
wealthy couples would apparently have a high divorce rate. Yet, studies
have shown that the divorce rate is lowest among high income groups. 39
Divorce cannot always be explained by one isolated factor, and courts should
not assume that alleged pecuniary profit will necessarily cause it.
A fourth reason often given for voiding antenuptial agreements specifying
alimony is that the state is a third party to the marriage. Because the allowance of alimony is determined by the divorce court,40 which represents the
31.

See Note, A Comparative Approach: The Divergent Paths of English and American
Take the Step from Fault to Breakdown?, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 101,

Divorce Reform -To
111-17, 126-28 (1969).

32. Litwak, Divorce Law as Social Control, in A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY
208 (1960).
33. N. BLAKE, THE ROAD To RYNo 229 (1962).
34. Note, supra note 31, at 127 states that traditional divorce court procedures are
unsuitable to determine whether a marriage has broken down and advocates a clinical approach utilizing psychologists and counselors.
35. Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916).
36. Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946).
37. Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896).
38. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.

39. W. GOODE, AFrER DIVORCE 53 (1956).
40. E.g., FLA. STAT. §61.08 (1969).
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state's interest, the consent of the court is required before the parties may
validly specify alimony.41 Adhering to the concept that marriage is a status
with certain duties imposed by law, one court voided a contract that provided the wife with 5,000 dollars in lieu of alimony. 42 The court reasoned
that the contract was intolerable because it threatened marital rights and
duties fixed by law.43 Thus, the marital status may be modified only with
4
the law's sanction. 4
In several cases courts have struck down agreements waiving or specifying
alimony without offering a legal rationale. 45 These opinions assert that such
contracts facilitate separation and divorce and are therefore void as against
public policy. Underlying the public policy in these cases and those previously discussed 46 is the notion that marriage is good per se, which is the
traditional view maintained by the courts despite significant reorientations
in societal values.
A valid state interest justifying a public policy protecting marriage does
exist. However, public policy should not be inflexibly utilized to void an
antenuptial alimony provision that does not endanger the marriage. In
certain situations denying effect to contractual variations of traditional
marital duties may actually be unwise and unfair.47 Nevertheless, through
such denials the courts have crystallized a doctrine allegedly based on public
48
policy into an unyielding rule of law.
The Legal Concept of Marriage
Courts have advanced three reasons for the importance that judicial
decisions accord to marriage:4 9 (1) the social organization of the state is
founded upon the marital relation; (2) personal morals require preserving
the sanctity of marriage; and (3) marriage can be dissolved only by fulfilling
statutory requirements, and a contract avoiding these is a fraud upon the
state's interest in the marriage compact.
In Gallemore v. Gallemore,50 the Florida supreme court stated that marriage "is regarded by the law and the state as the basis of the social organization. The preservation of that relation is deemed essential to the public
welfare."' 51 While the family and the marital relation undoubtedly still
occupy an important place in modern society, the family and consequently
41. Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961).
42. Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 216 P. 92 (1923).
43. Id. at 167, 216 P. at 96.
44. Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784 (1939).
45. Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928); Kalsem v. Froland, 207
Iowa 994, 222 N.W. 3 (1928); Scherba v. Scherba, 340 Mich. 228, 65 N.W.2d 758 (1954);
Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848 (1946).
46. See cases cited notes 24-45 supra.
47. Note, Marriage, Contracts,and Public Policy, 54 HARv.L. Rav. 473, 479 (1941).

48. Id. at 482.
49. Note, supra note 47, at 473.
50. 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927).

51. Id. at 518, 114 So. at 372.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss1/6
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the marriage are no longer held together by the physical and economic ties
that existed when traditional policy toward marriage evolved. 5 2 The economic factors once necessitating marital stability and the religious restraints
that decreed marriage an indissoluble sacrament are no longer compelling.
Moreover, a developing philosophy regards woman as the equal of man,
recognizing her equal right to manage her own affairs and stressing the
happiness and fulfillment of the individual woman as against the "stem duty
imposed by an unalterable status." 53
Concerning the place of marriage and the family before the law, the
Supreme Court of Florida has stated: 5"
Our civilization and moral standards rest largely upon the existence
of homes and the family relation . . . [a]nd for that reason the
State is a party [at] interest in every marriage contract . . . and to
this end it is the policy of the State not to permit the dissolution of
the marriage relation by any agreement between the other two contracting parties, but only when the State, through its Judicial branch,
determines that there are just grounds as provided and defined by
statute for the annulment of the marriage relation and enters the
decree of this court terminating the contract.
Although marriage may have perpetuated personal morals to some degree,
it has been unable to prevent social and economic change from altering the
traditional morality of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when
marriage was regarded as good per se. This is not to suggest that marriage
is a dying institution, but rather that increasingly numerous persons consider its essential value to be based on love, companionship, and freedom of
choice -not on notions of goodness per se.55 In the courts' rigid view, however, any individual modification of the legal aspects of marriage is prohibited. Thus, whether or not the amount provided is adequate, an antenuptial contract stipulating the wife's alimony in event of divorce will be
invalidated by most courts. Concerning the rule that contracts disturbing
the marriage relation are void, one writer said: 56 "When this doctrine was
formulated, marriage was considered an irrevocable commitment; as legal
impediments and social opprobrium are removed from divorce, more careful
consideration may be given to the wisdom all outlawing a contract in a particular case."
Public policy has been defined as "a principle of judicial legislation or
interpretation founded on the current needs of the community." 57 Considering

52. W. FRIUMMANN, supra note 2, at 216.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 216-17.
Potter v. Potter, 101 Fla. 1199, 1203-04, 133 So. 94, 96 (1931).
Litwak, supra note 32, at 212.
Note, supra note 47, at 473.

57.

Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 76, 92 (1928).
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the breakdown concept of divorce58 and the results of sociological studies,59
it seems dear that the arbitrary rationale used by the courts to invalidate
alimony provisions is no longer justifiable. If public policy is, in fact, based
on current needs, courts should reexamine judicial policy concerning the
marital relationship and, if obsolete, appropriately alter it.
THE TREND Towm

REmASON

One of the few cases in which a court scrutinized the situation of the
parties before voiding an antenuptial agreement was Fricke v. Fricke.60 The
antenuptial contract provided that, in the event of divorce, the wife would
receive 2,000 dollars in lieu of alimony. At age 62 the husband had married
his housekeeper of thirteen years. The majority opinion adhered to the
usual view that the state has an interest in the marital relation and stated
that unusual conditions causing an increase in divorce rates did not require
the court to change its attitude toward marriage obligations. 61 Noting that
dower is inchoate until the husband's death, the court distinguished a prior
Wisconsin case 62 that permitted the parties to contract before marriage with
respect to dower. Thus, unlike alimony provisions that take effect only on
divorce, antenuptial provisions relating to dower were not thought to encourage divorce since they become effective only upon the death of the
husband. The court concluded that an antenuptial contract purporting to
limit the husband's liability in event of separation or divorce was void as
against public policy regardless of the circumstances motivating its adoption
or attending its execution.
In a well reasoned dissent, Justice Brown took issue with the majority's
holding,3 reasoning that while public policy favors marriage and encourages
marital stability, contracts defining the responsibilities of the contracting
parties also promote stability. If contracts generally are desirable, it should
not be presumed that contracts in the marital setting promote discord. However, the fixed rule applied by the majority disregarded the adequacy of
the provision as well as all other circumstances. The broad decision applied
a rule of malum in se to a situation that should be measured by a rule of
reason. If, in an antenuptial agreement with his wife, a husband made a
provision that later seemed too generous, he might be deterred from seeking
a divorce and might moderate his own conduct because of the financial
penalty he would suffer under the agreement. A widower with a family to

58. California's new divorce law, which provides that a divorce may be granted if
irreconcilable differences cause marital breakdown, indicates emerging legal acceptance of
the breakdown principle. CAL. CIVIL CODE §4506 (West 1969). See generally Note, supra note

31.
59. See text accompanying notes 25-48 supra.
60. 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
61. Id. at 126, 42 N.W.2d at 501.
62. Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N.W. 516 (1915).
63. Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 129-33, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502-04 (1950) (dissenting
opinion).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss1/6
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support might desire to marry an independently wealthy woman who neither
needs nor wants his support; yet he might be deterred from doing so unless
he could limit his liability to protect his immediate family in event of
divorce. Thus, in certain circumstances prenuptial agreements specifying
alimony may encourage the marital relation, rather than disturb it. "Public
policy does not require that an elderly woman desiring marriage must
remain single if she cannot find a man who is willing to leave everything to
chance and put his property at the disposal of the court, if someday a court
thinks it proper to grant a divorce . . ."-4 The dissent concluded that it
would be wiser to allow trial courts to determine the validity of prenuptial
agreements according to the circumstances of each case, rather than voiding
all such agreements by applying ironclad rules.
Few courts have approached antenuptial agreements specifying alimony
with a rule of reason. The Georgia supreme court has even held that the
presence of an alimony provision voided an entire prenuptial contract and
that it was error to admit the agreement in evidence for any purpose. 65
Usually, however, courts have voided only the provisions relating to alimony
and have upheld other provisions prescribing the spouse's property rights.6
A recent decision invalidated an antenuptial contract that sought to divide
an estate in event of divorce but admitted it in evidence on the issue of
67
property division.
Two non-Florida cases have upheld alimony provisions in antenuptial
contracts. In Hudson v. Hudson,68 the Oklahoma supreme court upheld a
prenuptial agreement providing that neither spouse would assert any claim
for alimony in event of divorce, thus limiting their claims to property
acquired during the marriage. A lower court had granted alimony to the
wife despite the agreement, but the appellate court held that no alimony
was justified. No reason for the decision was given; the court merely cited
authority for the premise that antenuptial contracts were conducive to
marital harmony because they settled disputes prior to marriage.6 9 The
second case, Reiling v. Reiling,70 is a more thoughtful decision. Before marriage, the parties released all rights in each other's property, and the woman
waived her alimony rights. Nevertheless, a lower court granted the wife
alimony. In reversing the alimony award on appeal, the Oregon court considered the fair disclosure surrounding execution of the agreement and the
fact that the wife was planning to return to work.71 This decision employed
64. Id. at 132, 42 N.V.2d at 504 (dissenting opinion).
65. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234, 255, 123 S.E.2d 115, 134 (1961).
66. Comment, supra note 18, at 632.
67. Strandburg v. Strandburg, 33 Wis. 2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349 (1967). The antenuptial
contract in this case specified the property that the wife would receive at her husband's
death, not at divorce. The court refused to recognize the validity of such an agreement
effective at divorce, reasoning that to do so would allow the parties indirectly to achieve
the same result as a prenuptial agreement that took effect in event of divorce.
68. 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).
69. Id. at 598.
70. 463 P.2d 591 (Ore. App. 1970).
71. Although the actual written agreement considered in this case was executed after
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a highly desirable factual analysis and considered such factors as whether
support is necessary, the fairness of the agreement's execution, and the adequacy of the provision for the wife.
In most of the cases that have reached the appellate courts, the provision
for the wife has been inadequate and unfair. An antenuptial agreement
providing that, upon divorce, the wife was to receive 100 dollars in lieu of
alimony for each year of the marriage, and was to leave the marital home
forever within twenty-four hours after receiving the settlement was considered "a wicked device to evade the laws applicable to marriage relations
.... ,,72
In view of the frequent inequity of such agreements, it is under73
standable that courts have reacted with outrage and voided such agreements.
Nonetheless, by choosing to invalidate these contracts with a rigid, inflexible
rule of law, the courts have prevented parties from agreeing in good faith
to limit a spouse's alimony even where a limitation is justified.
That some prenuptial agreements are admitted in evidence for the
purpose of determining the equities of a proposed property division
indicates that some courts are beginning to modify their inflexible view of
antenuptial contracts specifying alimony.74 The traditional view was apparently rejected altogether in Hudson and Reiling. Recent cases also indicate
a change in the attitude of Florida courts toward antenuptial agreementsa change that has culminated in a decision espousing a more modern viewpoint of family law.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN FLORIDA

It is necessary to examine Florida law pertaining to alimony before considering judicial treatment of alimony provisions in antenuptial agreements.
The framework of statutory and case law relating to alimony generally
affects the courts' reasoning concerning alimony provisions.
Alimony Provisions in Separation Agreements
Florida statutes provide that the court shall make orders awarding
alimony, such award to be determined from the circumstances of the parties
the marriage ceremony, it was based on an oral antenuptial agreement, and the court and
the parties treated it as an antenuptial contract. Id. at 592.
One statement in the opinion might dilute the case's strength as precedent. The court
said: "[T]he parties . .. have not questioned [the agreement's] validity by reason of the
time of execution ...." Id. at 592. It is unclear if this means the wife failed to contend
that the provision waiving alimony was void because it was contained in an antenuptial
contract. If this issue was not raised, the case has little meaning; such a possibility is
plausible because: "Mhe [wife] testified that she would be going to work in a short
time and while some support would no doubt be convenient to her, there is no showing
of necessity for support." Id. at 592.
72. In re Duncan, 87 Colo. 149, 285 P. 757, 70 A.L.R. 824 (1930).
73. The Duncan opinion asserted that the agreement was an attempt to legalize
prostitution at $100 per year. Id. at 152, 285 P. at 757.
74. See cases cited infra note 129.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss1/6

10

AGREEMENTS
Zimmer: Public ANTENUPTIAL
Policy, The Courts,
and Antenuptial Agreements Specifying

and the nature of the case.7 5 This statute appears to vest sole discretion in
the chancellor, who apparently would not be bound by stipulations of the
parties relating to alimony. However, another statutory section authorizes
the circuit courts to modify or confirm alimony or support payments as
determined by agreement between husband and wife.- This statute implies
that spouses may employ separation agreements77 to stipulate alimony. Unless
directly conducive to the procurement of divorce, separation agreements that
concerned both property and alimony and that were executed in contemplation of divorce have been upheld by the Florida supreme court.7 8 The court
has also stated: "Agreements made in good faith, free from fraud, deceit or
trickery relating to alimony between husband and wife, or the adjustment
of their property rights, though made in contemplation of divorce, can or
79
may be sustained or upheld by the courts.."
In most instances Florida courts have felt bound by stipulations in
separation agreements that prescribe alimony.8 0 The First District Court
of Appeal has held that good faith separation agreements should be respected
by the courts8 ' and that provisions of such agreements constituting a final settlement between the parties should be construed according to ordinary contract law.8 2 Cases from the second district indicate that separation agreements have been respected in the absence of fraud, overreaching or concealment 8 3 but that the power to adjudicate the reasonableness and fairness of
the agreement was retained by the court.8 4 The Third District Court of
Appeal has also recognized stipulations for support and alimony in separation agreements saying: "The amount of support for a wife which the parties
have agreed upon should be held to be binding and applicable in the event
of divorce unless there is a sufficient showing of change of circumstances to
warrant and require its modification." 85
75. FLA. STAT. §61.08 (1969).
76. FLA. STAT. §61.14 (1969).
77. Separation agreements are contracts entered into after marriage, which contemplate
separation or divorce. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENrS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CoNTRAcrs

§§90.38, .18 (1964).
78. E.g., Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927).
79. Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 726, 7 So. 2d 9, 11 (1942).
80. In Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953), the Florida supreme court
said Florida courts should not abrogate alimony provisions in a separation agreement without
the consent of the parties. However, this is merely dicta since the case involved the subsequent modification of an alimony award after the agreement had been incorporated in the
divorce decree. A decree providing for alimony payments may subsequently be modified
even though it incorporates a separation agreement. If the agreement is a property settlement that disposes of all rights of the parties, it is not modifiable. See Beuchert, Power of
Florida Courts To Modify Marital Settlements, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 487 (1963).
81. Westberry v. Westberry, 191 So. 2d 871 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1966); Hostler v. Hostler,
151 So. 2d 672 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
82. Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1958).
83. Pemelman v. Pemelman, 186 So. 2d 552 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Howell v. Howell,
164 So. 2d 231 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1964).
84. Cordrey v. Cordrey, 206 So. 2d 234 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
85. Brenske v. Brenske, 151 So. 2d 58, 61 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d
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Thus, Florida courts have agreed that separation agreements specifying
alimony are permissible so long as they are fairly made. This approach is
reasonable since the parties themselves would seem best qualified to determine
what amounts of support the wife should receive and how their property
should be distributed. If the parties stipulate their issues for the court,
more harmony during divorce proceedings should result and the parties
may plan for the future with certainty, relying on their existing stipulations.
Considering this reasoning and Florida precedent, it was surprising when
Dawkins v. Dawkins 6 held that Florida Statutes, section 65.08,87 vested sole
discretion in the chancellor to settle alimony, and that the parties could not
divest him of this discretion by contract. The per curiam opinion asserted
that agreements not violative of public policy could be adopted by the
chancellor, but that "there is no statute or rule of law which says they
must be." 's For authority the court relied on Florida National Bank and
Trust Co. v. United States,89 which involved a suit for alleged overpayment
of estate taxes by a bank, executor of decedent husband's estate. At issue was
the taxable character of a transfer of stock in accordance with a separation
agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. The federal district court
construed section 65.08 and Florida case law as permissive in nature, giving
the chancellor complete discretion in adopting agreements of the parties
even if the parties regarded the agreement as a binding contract. However,
the agreement in FloridaNational Bank was not a binding contract between
the husband and wife because the parties expressly stipulated that their
agreement would be ineffective until adopted by the chancellor as part of
the divorce decree. 90 In short, the parties themselves gave the chancellor
discretion to adopt their agreement. The Florida court's reliance on Florida
National Bank thus seems misplaced since the agreement in Dawkins was
effective between the parties when made. However, Dawkins may be reconciled with the weight of Florida precedent in that the chancellor found the
separation agreement was unfair and overreaching, not meeting the required
criterion of fairness.9 1 It is unclear why the decision was not expressly based
on the lack of fairness, thereby remaining consistent with the past reasoning
of Florida courts.
Gelfo v. Gelfo92 is less easily reconciled. There was no evidence of fraud
or unfairness in the procurement of the separation agreement, 93 which provided for the wife's waiver of alimony as consideration for her husband's
693 (Fla. 1963); accord, Bare v. Bare 120 So. 2d 186 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
86. 172 So. 2d 633 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
87. This provision was substantially the same as present FLA. STAT. §61.08 (1969). See
text accompanying note 75 supra.
88. Dawkins v. Dawkins, 172 So. 2d 633, 634 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
89. 182 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Fla. 1960).
90. Id. at 78.
91. See text and cases accompanying notes 78-85 supra.
92. 198 So. 2d 353 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
93. The court noted that the husband's lawyer drew up the separation agreement while
the wife did not have an attorney, but conceded that there was no fraud or unfairness.
1d- at .54.
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promise to transfer certain property. Nevertheless, the chancellor voided the
agreement holding that no consideration was given in exchange for the wife's
waiver of alimony. The Third District Court of Appeal, despite its earlier
pronouncements to the contraryo 4 held that the chancellor was justified in
disregarding the agreement and cited Dawkins as authority. The opinion
admitted the decision would be difficult to reconcile with the weight of
authority, but insisted that the chancellor could void the agreement if, in
his discretion, he believed it unconscionable. Judge Swann dissented, arguing that the court should uphold a good faith agreement executed voluntarily
and that the husband's promise, which he subsequently carried out, was
95
adequate consideration for the wife's waiver of alimony.
These decisions were unfortunate because they rendered uncertain the
viability of existing agreements made in good faith between husband and
wife. Carried to their logical conclusion, the decisions mean that the
chancellor may completely disregard the desires of the spouses even when
their wishes are reduced to contract. Moreover, if the chancellor were not
bound by an alimony provision in a separation agreement, by implication,
he would also not be bound by an alimony provision in an antenuptial
agreement. Conversely, if he were bound by either of these agreements, the
other would also bind him unless public policy voided the agreement.
Alimony Provisions in Antenuptial Agreements
Florida courts first considered the validity of antenuptial contracts in
1869.98 Such agreements have been upheld if they were executed in good
faith and without fraud or concealment.9 7 The Supreme Court of Florida has
enforced antenuptial contracts that deal exclusively with property rights. s
Moreover, a presumption exists in Florida that antenuptial contracts are
valid, and the burden of proving otherwise is on the party challenging the
contract.09
To successfully challenge an antenuptial agreement in Florida, the contesting party must show that the agreement does not conform to the
standards laid down by the Florida supreme court in Del Vecchio v. Del
Vecchio.10° In that case the plaintiff wife sued the executor of her deceased
husband's estate to set aside an antenuptial agreement that released the wife's
dower interest in consideration of the conveyance of a house to the wife. She

94.
95.
96.
97.

See text accompanying note 84 supraand notes 110-111 infra.
Gelfo v. Gelfo, 198 So. 2d 353, 356 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla. 148 (1869).
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); J. CARSON, A PRAcrIcAL
TRATISE ON THE LAW OF Tm FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN FLORIDA 81 (1950).
98. North v. Ringling, 149 Fla. 739, 7 So. 2d 476 (1942); Northern Trust Co. v. King,
149 Fla. 611, 6 So. 2d 539 (1942). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
validity of prenuptial agreements in Florida except with respect to the wife's right of support.
Fahs v. Merrill, 324 U.S. 308, 309 (1945).

99. Johnson v. Johnson, 140 So. 2d 358, 361 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
100. 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
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alleged that she had not received full disclosure of her husband's property,
and on this basis the trial court struck down the agreement. The intermediate appellate court reversed 01 and held that failure of the husband to
disclose his assets where the wife knew or should have known of her husband's substantial means would not void the agreement.
The Florida supreme court refused to adopt this reasoning and ruled
that, as in separation agreements, 10 2 full and fair disclosure of the husband's
assets must be made to the wife before she signs an antenuptial agreement.
Moreover, when provision for the wife is disproportionate to the husband's
means, the burden shifts to the husband or his executor to show that his
wife had, or reasonably should have had, full knowledge of her husband's
property303 The supreme court then stated the criteria for a valid antenuptial agreement: either a fair and reasonable provision for the wife, or a
full and frank disclosure to the wife of the husband's assets, or the wife's
general and approximate knowledge of the husband's property. Mere
inadequacy of the wife's provision will not alone invalidate an antenuptial
contract; however, if the provision is unfair, it must appear that the wife
understood her waiver of rights. It is also preferable, but not prerequisite,
that she have independent advice. The fairness of the agreement is measured
at the time of the agreement's execution and is evaluated with respect to the
husband's property at that time. Fair provisions should enable the wife to
live after marriage in a reasonable manner and not less comfortably than
before the marriage. Moreover, the burden is on the husband to inform,
rather than on his wife to inquire. Although the courts no longer recognize
the archaic presumption of the husband's dominance, judges are aware that
the parties do not always deal at ann's length.1After Del Vecchio, a Florida appellate court upheld the inadequate
provisions of an antenuptial agreement on the basis that the wife, who was
advised by an attorney, had full understanding of her rights when she signed
the agreement. 0 5 The court stated there must be fraudulent concealment in
order to set the agreement aside. 10 Florida courts have also applied the contract doctrine of rescission to antenuptial agreements where the parties in
effect abandoned the agreement, 07 and the admission of parol evidence
has been permitted where the agreement was ambiguous on its face. 08
Appellate courts have given the chancellor's determination of the validity
of an antenuptial agreement the same weight as a jury verdict and have
overturned such a determination only where there existed no competent
evidence upon which his findings could be based. 0 9
101.
102.
103.
104.

Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 132 So. 2d 771 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
Weeks v. Weeks, 143 Fla. 686, 689, 197 So. 393, 394 (1940).
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962).
Id. at 21.

105. Cantor v. Palmer, 166 So. 2d 466 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
106. Id. at 468.
107. McMullen v. McMullen, 185 So. 2d 191 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
108. Mead v. Mead, 193 So. 2d 476 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
109. Reese v. Reese, 212 So. 2d 33 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968); Fern v. Fern, 207 So. 2d 291
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
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Recently, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida considered two
antenuptial agreements specifying alimony. In Lindsay v. Lindsay, 1o the
husband and wife had agreed that the wife would waive all her rights to
alimony and support in the event of separation and divorce. The court of
appeal affirmed the chancellor's finding that the agreement was void and
held, although Del Vecchio implied that a husband and wife may agree on
alimony in event of a separation or divorce, it did not validate an antenuptial
agreement in which the wife waived her rights entirely, receiving nothing
in return. In Sack v. Sack,"' the same court substantially held that the
validity of an antenuptial agreement in which the wife waived alimony in
return for one dollar should be measured by the Del Vecchio standards if
divorce were granted on remand. These two decisions indicated that antenuptial agreements specifying alimony would be valid in Florida provided
the Del Vecchio requirements were met.
Uncertainty still remained however, because none of the decisions upholding antenuptial alimony provisions had considered the effect of public
policy on such provisions. Moreover, it was not entirely certain that the
chancellor was required to honor alimony provisions in either separation
12
or antenuptial agreements.
This uncertainty has apparently been resolved by the recent case of
Posner v. Posner."3 At age 22 Sari Frazier met her husband-to-be, Victor
Posner, when she went "to meet a millionaire.""14 During their four-year
courtship Sari urged Victor to marry her and to have an antenuptial agreement drawn up." 5 Prior to the marriage Sari discussed the unexecuted antenuptial agreement, which completely disclosed Posner's assets, with her father
and her attorney."16 After five years of marriage and two children, Sari sued
for alimony unconnected with divorce, child support, and a decree voiding
the antenuptial agreement. The chancellor entered a final decree that
granted the husband's counterclaim for divorce and provided 1,200 dollars
per month for child support and 600 dollars per month alimony to the wife.
The chancellor specifically concluded as a matter of law that the antenuptial agreement was a legally binding contract between the parties." 7 The
wife appealed.
In reversing, the Third District Court of Appeal split three ways. Judge
Hendry, writing for the court, followed the reasoning adopted in Dawkins
110. 163 So. 2d 336 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 170 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1964), appeal
dismissed, 176 So. 2d 132 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
111. 184 So. 2d 434 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966), rehearing denied, 203 So. 2d 370 (3d D.C.A.

Fla. 1967).
112. See text accompanying notes 86-95 supra.
113. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'g 206 So. 2d 416 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).

114. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
115. Id. at 7.
116. Posner v. Posner, 206 So. 2d 416, 420 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
The antenuptial agreement provided that in event of divorce, Sari would accept $600
per month in lieu of alimony or support, the payments continuing until her death or

remarriage. If Victor died prior to that time, the payments would cease and Sari would
receive a lump sum of $21,600. Id. at 416.
117. ld. at 417.
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and Gelfo.1l8 Under this view the chancellor has complete discretion to
determine alimony, and, although he may use an antenuptial agreement to
aid him in determining the appropriate amount, he is not bound to accept
the stipulation of the parties in an antenuptial agreement. Thus, the court
concluded the chancellor had erred in construing the Posners' agreement as
a "legally binding contract between the parties."
Chief Judge Carroll concurred in the reversal, but argued that the alimony provision of the antenuptial agreement was void as against public
policy. He believed Judge Hendry's opinion gave the chancellor the power
either to accept or reject an antenuptial contract relating to alimony and
concluded that this was undesirable because it renders uncertain whether
parties may rely on such agreements. Judge Carroll distinguished Del Vecchio
on the ground that public policy invalidates only antenuptial contracts
specifying alimony but does not void antenuptial agreements dealing with
property rights. Citing as precedent the weight of authority from other
jurisdictions," 19 he expressly repudiated his statement in Sack 20 that the
validity of an alimony provision in an antenuptial agreement should be
measured by Del Vecchio. It is unclear why public policy was not considered
in the earlier decisions of this same court. If actually relevant, and more than
merely a rationale resorted to when logic fails, it would seem to warrant
consistent application.
The third member of the court, Judge Swann, dissented, asserting that
the majority holding unjustifiably voided alimony provisions in antenuptial
contracts in all circumstances. He contended that all antenuptial agreements,
even those containing alimony provisions, should be measured by Del Vecchio
standards. Moreover, since married women are permitted to stipulate alimony
in separation agreements, 121 single women should be accorded the same right.
The dissent noted that the facts of Posner indicated the provision for the
wife was fair and that she received complete and full disclosure as required by
law. The opinion also argued that, if a woman could waive her statutory
dower rights by antenuptial agreement, she should be able to contract concerning her alimony. After deciding the case the court sua sponte certified
22
the cause to the Florida supreme court.
The Supreme Court of Florida unanimously reversed, holding that the
Del Vecchio principles controlled and that the chancellor had correctly
applied these principlesj 2 s On the basis of the Del Vecchio standards, the
opinion upheld the chancellor's conclusion that the antenuptial agreement
118. See text accompanying notes 86-95 supra.
119. See text and cases accompanying notes 25-73 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
122. Certification was accomplished pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, §2. The question
certified was: "[W]hether a provision of an antenuptial contract, specifying an amount of
alimony to be accepted by a prospective wife in the event of separation or divorce is valid,
or is void as against public policy." Posner v. Posner, No. 37,162, at 2 (Fla., April 9, 1969),

aff'd on rehearing,233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
123. Posner v. Posner, No. 37,162 (Fla. April 9, 1969).
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was a legally binding contract. "Had the Del Vecchio criteria not been met,
the chancellor would have been justified in declaring that the antenuptial
agreement was invalid and thus not binding on the court. . . [T]his was
not the factual posture of the case at bar."'124 The court disposed of the
public policy argument by stating perfunctorily that the distinction between
alimony in Posner and dower in Del Vecchio is immaterial as far as Florida's
public policy is concerned.
This opinion did not fully clarify Florida's policy regarding alimony
provisions in antenuptial contracts, and it left certain issues unresolved.
First, to assert that waiving alimony is no different from waiving dower
evades the question because the two are intrinsically different. Dower is
determined by the amount of real property the husband owned during his
marriage and the amount of personal property he possessed at his death. 125
Alimony, on the other hand, is based on two factors: the ability of the
husband to provide for his ex-wife, and the needs of the wife based on the
standard of living created by the husband during the marriage. 12 These
two factors suggest the second unresolved issue: modification of the stipulated alimony. If the husband loses his ability to pay the stipulated amount,
it seems unfair to hold him to his promise. Likewise, if the wife's needs
have become disproportionate to the stipulated award, she should not be
left without adequate means of support. Nonetheless, the original opinion in
Posner indicated that the lower courts should construe this type of antenuptial agreement as strictly as any other contract.
The court may have realized that its opinion inadequately considered
the issues because rehearing was granted and another opinion issued nearly
a year later.' 27 This new opinion thoroughly discusses the relevant public
policy issues. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Roberts noted that
the state traditionally had maiantained an interest in marriage as the
foundation of society, and this interest is responsible for the rule voiding
alimony provisions in antenuptial contracts. He then recognized, however,
that society's view of marriage is changing, that divorce rates are rising, and
radical new divorce laws are being adopted.128 These facts induce couples
to settle more than their property rights in antenuptial agreements and to
stipulate alimony in event of possible divorce. Moreover, the use of these
agreements relating to divorce is increasingly sanctioned by the courts.," 9
124. Id. at 5.
125.

FLA. STAT. §731.84 (1969).

126. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1951).
127. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).

128. "[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the concept of the 'sanctity' of a
marriage - as being practically indissoluble, once entered into - held by our ancestors only
a few generations ago, has been greatly eroded in the last several decades. This court can
take judicial notice of the fact that the ratio of marriages to divorces has reached a disturbing rate in many states; and that a new concept of divorce - in which there is no
'guilty' party -is being advocated by many groups and has been adopted by the State of

California.... Id. at 384.
129. The opinion cited the following cases: LeFevers v. LeFevers, 240 Ark. 992, 403
S.W.2d 65 (1966) court did not question the validity of antenuptial agreement that
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The opinion concluded that these societal changes required a change in
public policy and consequently in the rule that antenuptial agreements settling alimony and property rights upon divorce are void. If the agreement
meets the Del Vecchio standards, and if the divorce is prosecuted in good
faith so that the agreement cannot be said to have encouraged the divorce,
the agreement is valid.
Such an agreement may be modified when originally presented to the
chancellor and after the divorce decree is entered. 30 Modification must be
carried out under applicable statutory'
and case law1s 2 and should be
allowed only upon a showing of compelling circumstances. For example,
the husband must show that he can no longer meet his obligations or the
1
wife must demonstrate her increased need. "'
Modification should prevent abuse of antenuptial agreements. An alimony provision in a fairly executed antenuptial agreement is not used to
cut off the wife's support. It limits the husband's alimony liability to an
amount agreed to constitute a sum sufficient for the wife. Such an agreement primarily protects a husband from the avarice of a bitter wife during
divorce proceedings,"34 and it prohibits the use of alimony as a punishment.
Posner ends all speculation about the validity of alimony provisions in
antenuptial agreements in Florida. It also implies that Florida courts should
properly respect alimony provisions in separation agreements when full
disclosure of the husband's assets has been made. The decision seems certain
to be a leading case in a trend toward liberalized family law.
FURTHER

PROPOSALS

AND

CONSIDERATIONS

While Posner may seem dramatic, it is a logical step when viewed against
the development of cases dealing with antenuptial agreements. It would
provided that in event of divorce the wife should be restored to her own property rights);
In re Muxlow's Estate, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962) (in a suit between heirs of
the spouse the court upheld antenuptial agreement limiting the husband's spousal obligations to the wife in event of divorce); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960) (antenuptial contract limiting alimony in event of divorce was upheld); Sanders v. Sanders, 40
Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1955) (court held valid a forfeiture provision in antenuptial contract that was applicable only when divorce was filed in bad faith; Strandburg
v. Strandburg, 33 Wis. 2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349 (1967) (provision in antenuptial contract
calling for property division in event of divorce was admissible in evidence to help determine the division).
130. Posner v. Posner 233 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1970).
131. E.g., FLA. STAT. §61.14 (1969) (this statute was enacted during the depression of
the 1930's to alleviate hard-pressed husbands); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 387 (FNa.
1970) (concurring opinion).
182.

See note 80 supra.

133. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 881, 387 (Fla. 1970) (concurring opinion). If the
wife shows an increased need justifying modification, the court will then consider the exhusband's current ability to pay.
134. Judge Swann asserted that Mrs. Posner was really saying: "[I]t ain't enough
alimony, now, I want more." Posner v. Posner, 206 So. 2d 416, 420 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968)
(dissenting opinion).
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be premature to consider this case as signalling an end to development of
this area of family law. Legal rules that simplify difficult determinations of
fact may be needed.
To protect the woman from deception and the man from having an
antenuptial agreement disregarded in divorce court, it is suggested that the
courts presume that antenuptial agreements are made at arm's length when
each party is represented by legal counsel. Both sides would then strive for
full disclosure of the husband's assets. If such a rule were adopted, the
husband would be induced to insure that his wife was represented by an
attorney in order to protect himself against later claims of nondisclosure.
Since it would be easy for the chancellor to determine if the wife were
represented, such a rule could save court time now spent in factfinding at
the trial court level. 135 Moreover, many attorneys have become skilled at
marital counseling because of their extensive experience in domestic relations
law. A rule invoking the assistance of attorneys before the marriage would
also benefit the parties by allowing them to become knowledgeable in
advance about the legal aspects of their marriage. 138 This rule also recognizes
that the courts should be reluctant to treat an antenuptial agreement made
by unassisted parties as just another contract. 137 At the same time, the attorney
would protect the interests of the wife and, in so doing, would indirectly
protect the state's interest in the marital relation.
A rule encouraging both parties to secure counsel to draw up an antenuptial agreement is expedient considering the group characteristics of
those who usually execute antenuptial agreements. A study has shown that
only 18 per cent of the couples obtaining a divorce have property worth more
than 4,000 dollars to be divided in the divorce action.'3 8 Those who executed
antenuptial agreements containing alimony provisions in the decided cases
were almost exclusively middle aged or older, and most of the spouses had
been married before. 139 The person who considers adopting an antenuptial
agreement generally owns property accumulated over the years. He wants to
protect his property from disposal by a divorce court, and often is motivated
by a desire to save his property for children of a first marriage. Such a person
has probably dealt with attorneys and is likely to consult with them when he
decides to marry; it seems only fair that his fiancee should also receive the
benefit of an attorney's advice.
Florida courts have not yet recognized two other policy considerations.
135. The evidentiary hearings in Posner produced 900 pages of testimony. Posner v.
Posner, No. 37,162 (Fla., April 9, 1969), affd on rehearing, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
136. See Comment, Preventive Law and Family Law: Pre-MaritalPhases and Purposes,
12 VILL. L. REy. 839 (1967).

137. "At the outset we must recognize that there is a vast difference between a contract made in the market place and one relating to the institution of marriage." Posner v.
Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970). This proposal does not preclude needed modification
of the agreement. See text accompanying notes 130-134 supra.
138. W. GOODE, A=ra DIVORCE 217 (1956). The percentage is undoubtedly higher today,
but inflation, as well as increased affluence, probably is responsible for much of the increase. The fact remains that most divorces occur in lower economic strata. Id.
139. See cases cited noted 25-72 supra.
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First, a study has shown a direct positive correlation between an ex-husband's
favorable attitude toward his alimony payments and the continuity of such
payments. 4 ° A man who thinks an alimony award is too high is more likely
to default on his payments than one who feels that he is paying a just amount.
Common sense suggests that a man who has contracted for an alimony award
in an antenuptial agreement would usually feel the award justified. Thus,
the Posner decision could increase the consistency of alimony payments.
Second, allowing single women to execute antenuptial contracts containing alimony provisions furthers the single woman's right to contract. The
new Florida constitution provides for spousal equality as to property mat42
ters,'34 and a new statute makes this extension of women's rights a reality.
Since married women may sign alimony provisions in separation agreements, 143 unmarried women logically should also be allowed to sign alimony
provisions in antenuptial agreements. It has been asserted that parties to
an antenuptial agreement do not deal at arm's length,: 44 and that an unmarried woman, giddy over her upcoming marriage, cannot make a rational
decision. However, a married woman who is faced with the break-up of her
marriage is probably equally irrational. One study of domestic relations
cases concluded:-5
The "traditional psychological basis of law that man is a responsible
being able to choose his own ends and make his own adjustments"
doesn't seem to hold up in a considerable proportion of family court
cases. Perhaps the trauma of domestic disharmony so disturbs the
emotions of the spouses that their judgment becomes unsettled and
they are unable to think.
If the law presumes that an emotionally unsettled wife can validly contract with respect to alimony in a separation agreement, it is discriminatory
and arbitrary to prohibit a single woman from so contracting in an antenuptial agreement. Fortunately, the Posner case ends this anomaly.

140. W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 224 (1956).
141. FLA. CONST. art. X, §5 (1968) provides: "There shall be no distinction between
married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of
their property, both real or personal; except that dower or curtesy may be established and
regulated by law." See also Note, Interspousal Immunity in Tort: Its Relevance, Constitutionality, and Role in Conflict of Laws, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 484, 490-94 (1969), for a discussion of how the new Florida constitution affects spousal immunity in tort actions another legacy of the common law unity fiction of unity between husband and wife.
142. The 1970 Florida legislature enacted a bill that removes all common law disabilities
of married women in the holding and disposition of their property. For example, the
husband is no longer required to join in the wife's conveyances. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4.
143. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
144. Comment, "A Check List" for the Drafting of Enforceable Antenuptial Agreements,
19 U. Mu it L. Rxv. 615, 619 (1965).
145. Alexander, The Family Court -An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 602, 608-09
(1958).
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CONCLUSION

It is clear that the rule voiding alimony provisions is anachronistic.
Although the rule may have been sensible when marriage was considered
an indissoluble sacrament that was superior to the right of an individual
to contract, the reasons for the rule seem obsolete today. Sociologists list
so many causes for divorce that ascribing the breakdown of a marriage to
an alimony provision in an antenuptial agreement seems an absurd oversimplification. Moreover, the social concept of marriage outside the courts
is changing so rapidly that the law must either change or be alienated from
common social norms. One commentator has stated:'"1
The modern trend seems to be to regard marriage as a status only in
the subordinate sense, the relationship being primarily that of contract, which can be abrogated or dissolved and with considerably
more ease than one could extricate one's self from the liabilities
arising out of a business relationship.
It is extremely doubtful that the courts will soon view marriage as a
simple contract. 47 However, the Florida courts have discontinued striking
down otherwise valid antenuptial contracts on public policy grounds. Hopefully, this development foreshadows more individual freedom in shaping
one's own interpersonal relationships with regard to marriage.
C.

THomAs ZIMmER

146. McGuire, Civil Law Concerning Marriage, in FUNDAMENTAL MARRIAGE COUNSELING
416 (Cavanagh ed. 1963), cited in Comment, supra note 136, at 842.
147. See Comment, note 136 supra.
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